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 Urban expansion or clustered deconcentration? An applied welfare  
economic analysis of growth controls and the foundation of satellites 
 
Abstract: How should urban containment and the diversion of households to nearby 
residential areas be evaluated from a welfare economic perspective? Assuming the existence 
of a negative externality of city size, we develop a concise general equilibrium model for a 
mother city and a satellite. This satellite should be founded if the gain in surplus exceeds the 
fixed costs of intercity infrastructure provision, and a Pigouvian tax on the conversion of land 
to urban use in both cities would then attain the first-best allocation. Rising incomes and 
falling transport costs enhance the surplus gain from ‘clustered deconcentration’, or the 
accommodation of growth in planned satellites, relative to expansion of the mother city. 
Nevertheless, plans by the Dutch government to uphold strict growth controls around 
Amsterdam, while fostering large-scale residential construction projects in the nearby 
satellite of Almere, are difficult to reconcile with the optimal policy in a calibrated version of 
our model.  
 
Keywords: land use regulation, growth controls, systems of cities, housing markets, applied 
general equilibrium 
 
Classification-JEL: R52, R13, R14 
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1 Introduction 
 
Greenbelts or urban growth boundaries (UGB’s) are applied in cities all over the world, and 
their popularity appears to be on the rise both in Europe and the US.1 The upward effect that 
such policies exert on house prices in restricted areas is well documented in the economic 
literature2, but much less attention has been paid to their impact on surrounding regions. In 
locations that are sufficiently close substitutes, households that are somehow tied to the area 
will push up housing demand. This may give rise to scattered leapfrogging development, or 
boost growth in nearby communities. For example, the much debated UGB around Portland, 
Oregon, appears to have spurred population growth in nearby Clark County (Jun, 2004). To 
the extent that the jobs held by these households remain in the restricted area, growth controls 
will also push up intercity commuting. For instance, new jobs in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
where rigid land use restrictions exist, are increasingly held by people living at the outskirts of 
the region (cf. Ogura, 2005).  
The question that concerns us in this paper is, how the diversion of households from a 
restricted city to a nearby satellite should be evaluated from a welfare economic perspective. 
This diversion may be argued to be a harmful side-effect of growth controls, because it raises 
the total residential land consumption in the region, as well as the number of intercity 
commuters and the externalities they impose. Furthermore, the costs of providing 
infrastructure and other local public goods and services may be higher for the resulting pattern 
of spatial development (cf. Cho, 1997). On the other hand, the widespread popularity of urban 
containment policies suggests that people attach value to living in a small city, and this idea is 
also reflected in a theoretical literature on growth controls.3 Under such preferences, an 
equilibrium in which households are divided over a main city and one or more satellites may 
yield higher welfare than an equilibrium in which they all live in one big city. 
                                                 
1
 While an early form of greenbelt regulation existed already in sixteenth century London (Evans, 1999), several 
European countries nowadays conduct policies that foster the development or preservation of compact cities. 
Moreover, at the EU level, the pursuit of compact cities is expressed as an explicit policy goal (European 
Commission, 1999). The proliferation of urban growth boundaries in the US is documented by Nelson and 
Duncan (1995). Amongst cities in other parts of the world that have been subject to greenbelt regulation are 
Moscow (Russia), New Delhi (India), Ottawa (Canada), Seoul (Korea) and Tianjin (China) (Cho, 1997). 
2
 See Fischel (1990) for an early survey and Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) for an overview of more recent 
evidence.  
3
 For instance, Engle et al. (1992) argue that population growth may affect welfare in a city negatively because 
of congestion costs, pollution externalities and rising costs of public goods provision, while Brueckner (1990) 
considers a direct negative impact of the number of residents in a city on their wellbeing. These type of models 
have become known in the theoretical growth control literature as amenity-creation models, see Brueckner 
(1999) a survey. 
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Such considerations seem to have motivated so-called clustered or focussed 
deconcentration policies in the 1960s and 1970s. Against a background of substantial 
negative externalities in large cities and rising suburbanization, governments of various 
European countries fostered household growth in especially designated and sometimes newly 
founded satellite towns. The accommodation of growth in a limited number of satellites was 
preferred to unregulated sprawl, because this allowed for an efficient scale in terms of the 
supply of local public services and infrastructure, while limiting landscape fragmentation. 
Typical examples are the UK New Towns, the French Pôles de Croissance and the Dutch 
growth centres or Groeikernen (cf. Anas et al., 1998). These policies are of interest today, 
because they are still reflected in land use patterns and policies in Europe – as aptly illustrated 
for the Netherlands in Figure 1.1, while the popularity of European style urban growth 
boundaries and greenbelts appears to be on the rise in the US.4  
 In order to evaluate the diversion of households from a restricted city to a nearby 
satellite, we develop and calibrate a concise general equilibrium model. The distortion that 
motivates government intervention in land markets is a negative externality of the 
geographical size of a city, as experienced by its residents. This assumption is similar to the 
negative population externality that is common in the growth controls literature, but it relates 
more directly to land use and the role of open space. As all jobs are located in the central 
business district of the main city, residents of the satellite incur higher commuting costs, but 
they enjoy living in a city that is smaller. Furthermore, we allow for differences in the 
attractiveness of both cities, reflecting the level of cultural and historical amenities. This may 
be particularly relevant in a European setting, in which such amenities contribute significantly 
to the quality of life in the major ancient cities, while they are generally absent in newly found 
satellites. We show that taxing the conversion of land to urban use in both cities is a first-best 
policy response to the city size externality. Founding a satellite is desirable if the gain in 
surplus exceeds fixed costs that are incurred, modelled here as the costs of intercity 
infrastructure provision. In an extension, the optimal foundation of multiple satellites is 
considered.  
Our analysis is applied to the Dutch capital of Amsterdam and nearby Almere. 
Founded in the 1970s on land regained from the sea, this town was designated as a growth 
                                                 
4
 For instance, Irwin and Bockstael (2004) report on the effects of a development clustering policy in Maryland, 
US, which concentrates development and generates preserved open space.  
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Figure 1: Current and permitted future  
development in Amsterdam (left) and Almere (right) 
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centre that should accommodate population growth from the capital.5 The restrictiveness of 
present land use controls is substantial in Amsterdam and negligible in Almere, which may be 
inferred from the gap between house prices at the urban fringe and total marginal production 
costs. Moreover, future plans by the national and local governments consist of strict 
containment of Amsterdam and a major expansion of Almere. This is illustrated in Figure 1, 
which indicates areas that are presently built-up in these cities by grey zones, and areas in 
which new construction has been approved of by the national and local governments by black 
zones.6 It shows that residential construction in Amsterdam is mainly limited to infill 
development, whereas large plots for new construction are available in Almere.7  
                                                 
5
 An overview of land use regulation in the Netherlands is provided in Vermeulen and Rouwendal (2007). See 
Faludi and Van der Valk (1990) for an in depth discussion of the Dutch growth centre policy.  
6
 There data were taken from the ‘New map of the Netherlands’ (www.nieuwekaart.nl), a collection of all 
national and municipal land use regulations, in the fall of 2006.  
7
 This map is somewhat imprecise, though, because it does not indicate construction densities and the horizon of 
new plans is not always clear. Projections by provincial and municipal governments suggest that net of 
demolitions, the housing stock will grow with about 50,000 to 60,000 dwellings until 2030 in both Amsterdam 
and Almere. So in relative terms, the satellite is planned to grow at a much higher rate. About a third of all new 
construction in the northern part of the Randstad area (‘de Noordvleugel’) is planned to take place in Almere, 
while other towns in the region surrounding Amsterdam will expand at a significantly lower rate.  
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We calibrate the model in such a way that present land use restrictions are optimal by 
assumption. This turns out to require a city size externality that is so large that in order to 
internalize its effect, households in Amsterdam should spend about 10% of their income on 
(capitalized) development taxes, while they spend about 6% on land net of these taxes. The 
model may be used to evaluate plans for future residential development. For instance, its 
comparative static properties indicate how the optimal distribution of households over the 
main city and one or several satellites is affected by income and demographic growth. We 
also infer optimal population and city sizes in several scenario’s of income and demographic 
growth and contrast these to the land use plans that are indicated in Figure 1. Finally, we shed 
light on the social costs of implementing suboptimal policies, which may result from a 
misperception of the type or size of externalities.  
 Our study adds to a small number of applied welfare economic analyses of land use 
regulation such as Cheshire and Sheppard (2002), Bento et al. (2006) and Walsh (2007), 
which have been surveyed in Cheshire and Vermeulen (2008). It also relates to a concise 
literature on the Seoul greenbelt, which is modelled in a theoretical analysis by Cho (1997) 
and Lee and Fujita (1999) as a (congestible) multifunctional park that provides citizens with 
recreational areas, environmental amenities and scenic views, while Lee and Linneman (1998) 
provide evidence that proximity to this greenbelt is capitalized in residential land prices. 
Reflecting the rise of ‘periurban belts’ in France, Cavailhès et al. (2004) develop a model in 
which agricultural and residential land use are mixed in a zone around the urban fringe, but 
they do not perform a full welfare analysis of land use policies. To our knowledge, Ogura 
(2005) presents the only theoretical model on growth controls that does consider the 
possibility of intercity commuting from a nearby satellite, but taking a political economic 
perspective, this paper ignores the valuation of policy-induced amenities. To some degree, our 
analysis of the decision to found a satellite may be understood within the wider literature on 
systems of cities (cf. Henderson, 1987), which considers the optimal and equilibrium number 
of cities in a system as a function of fixed costs and (dis)economies of scale. In dynamic 
models, Henderson (1986) and Anas (1992) find that it is optimal to set up a new city much 
earlier than the date at which it would emerge under laissez-faire.8 Furthermore, the concept 
of satellites may bear some similarity to the edge cities that are analysed by Henderson and 
                                                 
8
 These models exhibit city-level agglomeration economies in production that are counterbalanced by congestion 
effects through rising costs of land and transportation. 
 7 
Mitra (1996). However, land use externalities are generally absent or they remain implicit in 
this literature.9 
 In the next section, we propose our model for a mother city and a satellite, and we 
derive first-best policies. The calibration of this model is discussed in section 3, where 
explicit consideration is also given to validation. Comparative static properties and policy 
analysis are contained in section 4. We then consider an extension with multiple satellites. 
The final section concludes and it puts the policy implications of our model into the 
perspective of the range of assumptions and simplifications that have necessarily been made.  
 
2 Theoretical framework 
 
After outlining model preliminaries and the geographical setting, this section considers the 
problem of a benevolent planner who wants to maximize social surplus under the constraint 
that all households reach the same target utility level. It is shown that the solution to this 
problem may be decentralized as a free market equilibrium with costless household mobility 
within and between cities through the imposition of appropriate transfers and development 
taxes. We then consider the desirability of founding a satellite if there are fixed setup costs 
and discuss the extension of our framework to multiple symmetric satellites. An investigation 
of comparative static properties is deferred to section 4, where we make use of the calibrated 
model.  
 
Preliminaries and geographical setting 
Households have a well-behaved utility function ( )SAszuu ,,,= , where s denotes the 
consumption of land and z is the consumption of a composite commodity that represents all 
other goods, including the capital component of housing. Furthermore, utility is affected by 
two city level variables A and S. The amenity level A reflects the inherent attractiveness of 
living in a city, due to for instance the presence of historical buildings or cityscapes. It also 
allows for a first pass on more endogenous factors, such as the variety of local services and 
the offer of cultural facilities, which tend to differ strongly between large cities and newly 
found satellites.  
 Fundamental to our analysis is the assumption that the utility of living in a city is 
decreasing in its geographical size S. The most immediate interpretation of this externality is 
                                                 
9
 A number of studies exist, though, that analyse optimal land use policies in a system of cities when intracity 
transport infrastructure is congestible. See for instance Anas and Pines (2008).  
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that people dislike to be surrounded by bricks and asphalt. The larger a city grows, the more 
they feel themselves lost in an ‘urban jungle’. Some evidence supporting this view may be 
found in an analysis of residential transactions in an exurban region in central Maryland, USA 
by Irwin (2002), who reports that conversion of agricultural land to low-density residential 
land had a negative impact on surrounding house prices, suggesting that one of the important 
attractions of open space is simply that it is not developed. In line with this view, stated 
preference studies indicate that negative externalities of residential development are an 
important motivation for the preservation of open space (cf. McConnell and Walls, 2005). 
Another way of interpreting the city size externality is that when S increases, the total amount 
of space left undeveloped is reduced and the distance to open space at the fringe rises for most 
residents in the city, which reduces welfare if open space at the city fringe is amenable and 
accessible to urban residents. Interpreted this way, the externality captures that society may 
value not only the total supply of open space in the country, but also its accessibility.10 
However, open space in parks may substitute for proximity to a greenbelt, which would 
reduce the negative externality effect of city size. We get back to this point in the concluding 
section, see also Cheshire and Vermeulen (2008) for a discussion.  
The way in which we model the open space externality may be compared to amenity 
creation models in the theoretical growth controls literature that exhibit a negative externality 
of population size (Brueckner, 1999). Under the assumption of fixed land consumption, which 
is generally made in such models, the two externalities are equivalent. In contrast, Brueckner 
(2001) and Bento et al. (2006) consider welfare effects of changing the total amount of 
undeveloped space, calculated as some given total amount of space minus city size. This 
approach has the somewhat unrealistic implication that a hectare of open space near the city 
boundary is valued in the same way by its residents as a hectare at a distance of, say, a 
hundred kilometres. The foundation of a satellite can not be optimal then, since it would raise 
the total residential land consumption. 
 The geographical setting of our analysis is illustrated in Figure 2. We consider a 
system of two monocentric cities, in which a total number of households N reside. This 
                                                 
10
 Since the total stock of open space in a country is typically only marginally reduced by urban expansion, its 
accessibility is in fact the more important aspect of this interpretation. Access to open space could be modelled 
more directly by assuming that in order to enjoy it, residents travel to the city fringe at a given frequency, which 
has to be lower than the frequency of commutes to the CBD. It may be shown that the optimal policy in this 
setting is a (Pigouvian) development tax, reflecting the increased travel costs that urban expansion imposes on all 
residents. Although this development tax does not have the same comparative static properties as the optimal 
development tax that we derive in this section, there is a strong similarity between the two externalities and 
associated optimal policies.  
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Figure 2: Geographical setting 
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number is taken to be exogenous, so the system can be interpreted as closed.11 Each 
household provides one unit of labour and all jobs are located in the Central Business District 
(CBD) of the main or mother city M. Residents who live at a distance r from this CBD incur 
commuting costs tr, where t denotes commuting costs per unit of distance. Residents of the 
satellite city S travel to the CBD of their city first, where they enter the intercity infrastructure 
network, and then to the CBD of the mother city. Living at a distance r of the satellite’s CBD, 
they incur commuting costs tr + icc, where icc denotes intercity commuting costs. So under 
these assumptions, the satellite’s CBD serves as an intercity infrastructure access point only, 
and it does not offer any employment opportunities. Note that the intercity commuting costs 
per unit of distance may be smaller than t, depending on the quality of the intercity 
infrastructure network.  
We rule out scattered residential development outside cities, as it would fragment open 
space at the city fringe and make it less valuable.12 In the context of our application to the 
cities of Amsterdam and Almere, this assumption is plausible since land use is regulated 
directly, so residential development outside cities can simply be prohibited.13 As a final point, 
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 It makes little sense in this setting to assume an open system, because growth controls in the mother city 
would not raise housing demand in the satellite then, whereas in the applications in which we are interested it 
clearly does.  
12
 The presence of a negative external effect of city size implies that households have an incentive to locate 
outside the city, if the negative effect on utility of the higher commuting cost is compensated by the avoidance of 
the negative external effect of city size. Hence, if we would not impose that all households reside within city 
boundaries, the presence of this external effect would lead to diffuse residential location patterns around main 
cities that are typically associated with the negative aspects of urban sprawl. See for instance Irwin and 
Bockstael (2004), who find that potential benefits of a development clustering policy in Maryland, US, may be 
offset, because protected parcels of land attract construction at neighbouring parcels.  
13
 In countries in which governments have less grip on land use, such as the US, such a pattern might still be 
obtained by declining the provision of infrastructure and other basic public goods at locations outside cities.  
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we note that the mother city and the satellite have to be located sufficiently far away from 
each other, so that the size of one city does not affect the utility of residents in the other.  
 
The social planner’s problem 
Essentially following the well-established Herbert-Stevens approach, we develop the welfare 
economic analysis in this paper by considering a benevolent social planner, who aims to 
maximize aggregate surplus under the side condition that each household has to reach a given 
target utility level u* (cf. Fujita, 1989).14 The contribution of an individual household to the 
aggregate surplus is defined as the income it generates, minus the costs that have to be 
incurred to grant it a utility of u*. Fixing household income at the exogenous wage level w, 
the optimal allocation may be interpreted as the least costly way to attain the target utility 
level for all households in the system of cities.  
It is useful to invert the utility function with respect to z for the target utility level u*, 
to obtain ( )SAsuZz ,,*,= . The function Z identifies iso-utility curves for different levels of 
u* and its partial derivatives with respect to the other variables may be interpreted in terms of 
the marginal willingness to pay for the goods they represent. By assumption, the signs of the 
partial derivatives are: 
 
0,0,0,0
*
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∂
∂
<
∂
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<
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
S
Z
A
Z
s
Z
u
Z
.        (1) 
 
The costs of granting a household the target utility level are then equal to the sum of 
commuting costs, opportunity costs of alternative land use and the expenditure on the 
composite commodity ( )SAsuZz ,,*,= . We assume that the alternative land use is 
agricultural, which yields a rent pa, and that the price of composite commodities is normalized 
to unity.15 Ignoring the costs of founding the satellite, the aggregate social surplus SS is then 
                                                 
14
 This approach is more convenient than the optimization of a utilitarian social welfare function, since different 
utility levels would have to be assigned to similar people in order to obtain the optimum, as shown by Mirrlees 
(1972). One unattractive feature of this unequal treatment of equals property is that it cannot occur in a 
decentralized free market setting. Surplus optimization avoids the problem by assigning the same utility level to 
all similar households at the outset. See Wildasin (1986) or Fujita (1989) for additional discussion.  
15
 In reality, there are costs to converting land from agricultural to residential use, relating for instance to the 
provision of local infrastructure. The model could be extended with a local public good that is produced using a 
constant returns technology. Ruling out substitution on the demand side, so that it would be provided with a 
constant land intensity, a constant would have to be added to the price of agricultural land in Equation 2. This is 
the approach we follow implicitly in our calibration.  
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obtained by integrating the surplus for each household over the total number of households in 
the two cities:  
 
( )( )
( )( ) ,,,*,
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0
0
∫
∫
−−−−+
−−−=
S
M
r
SSS
r
S
raS
r
S
r
r
MMM
r
M
raM
r
M
r
drSAsuZspicctrw
s
L
drSAsuZsptrw
s
LSS
     (2) 
 
where ri
 
denotes the distance from CBD to the fringe in city i, { }SMi ,∈ , irL  denotes the total 
amount of developable land at a distance r from the CBD of city i, and irs  denotes the 
consumption of land assigned to households living at a distance r from the CBD of city i. 
Note that ir
i
r sL  equals the household density at a distance r from the CBD of city i.  
The social planner’s problem is to choose an allocation ( )0,0,0 ≥≥≥ iiir Srs  that 
maximizes SS, while satisfying a number of constraints. In the first place, the household 
density has to integrate over the two cities to the total number of N: 
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Secondly, the total amount of developable land in urban use has to integrate to the 
(endogenous) geographical size Si for each city:16  
 
M
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M
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M
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S
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While conditions for the desirability of founding a satellite are discussed later in this section, 
for now we assume that both cities have a positive size in the optimum. Ignoring the 
inequality constraints, the Lagrangian associated with this optimization problem may be 
written as:17 
                                                 
16
 This second set of constraints could be avoided by including city size as a function of ri directly in the utility 
function, but we prefer the present equivalent specification because it is more insightful. 
17
 The problem could be solved more formally by applying optimal control theory, but the same outcome would 
obtain. See Fujita (1989) for a thorough discussion. 
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where λ, τM and τS are Lagrangian multipliers. The first order conditions associated with this 
problem are 0=∂∂ Mrs  for every Mrr ,0∈ , 0=∂∂ Srs  for every Srr ,0∈ , 
0=∂∂ Mr , 0=∂∂ Sr , 0=∂∂ MS  and 0=∂∂ SS . The first two conditions for 
surplus maximization refer to the demand for land. They imply that for every r within the city 
boundaries we have: 
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For future reference, it is useful to note that the left hand side of these expressions can be 
interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay for land, while the right hand side takes the 
form of a bid rent function. The next two conditions refer to the optimal city boundaries, and 
they may be written as follows: 
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Making use of Equations 6, these equations indicate that the marginal willingness to pay for 
land at the fringe of city i should be equal to the agricultural land rent plus a Lagrangian 
multiplier τi. The final two conditions refer to the optimal city size, yielding: 
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The left-hand side of these equations may be interpreted as the willingness to pay for a 
marginally smaller city, integrated over the total number of households in this city. From the 
comparative statics of ( )SAsuZ ,,*,  in Equations 1, we know that the multipliers τM and τS are 
positive, as long as both cities have a positive size. Equations 7 then imply that the marginal 
willingness to pay for land at the fringe of city i should exceed the agricultural land rent, so 
that urban land use is restricted in the social optimum. This suggests that the optimal policy in 
the presence of a city size negative externality may be decentralized through the imposition of 
a (Pigouvian) development tax that is equal to the external effect that a marginal extension of 
the size of a city imposes on its residents. Equivalently, the planner may regulate land use 
directly in order to obtain city sizes SM and SS, and the multipliers should then be interpreted 
as regulatory taxes or shadow prices of land use restrictions.18  
 
Decentralization of the social optimum 
Consider now a situation in which the role of the central planner is limited to setting 
development taxes Mτˆ  and Sτˆ , and imposing a (possibly negative) lump sum tax λˆ  on each 
household, while leaving the allocation of goods and land to competitive markets. Assume 
further that household mobility within and between cities is costless. A household that resides 
at location r in city i then faces the budget constraint ( ) trwSAsuZsp iiiririr −−=+ λˆ,,,ˆ , where 
i
rp  denotes the land rent and uˆ  denotes the equilibrium utility level. Under well-known 
conditions, a unique equilibrium exists that is fully determined by the following conditions 
                                                 
18
 Direct land use regulation is much more common than taxation of residential development or residential land 
consumption, which are equivalent in a competitive setting where builders pass the development tax on to 
households. Nevertheless, there is some similarity between taxation of development and the Impact Fees that are 
gaining widespread popularity in the USA.  
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(cf. Fujita, 1989). First, equilibrium on land markets requires that irp  within both cities equals 
the bid rent function, which is defined as the maximum rent per unit of land that a household 
is willing to pay while attaining uˆ . This condition may be written as: 
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The maximization problem in these equations is resolved when irp  equals the marginal 
willingness to pay for land irsZ ∂∂− , which yields a condition for the consumption of land irsˆ  
at each location. The size of each city is determined by the condition that land rents at the city 
fringe should equal the sum of agricultural rents and the development tax. Finally, the 
equilibrium utility level uˆ  is determined by the condition that N households have to be 
accommodated in the system of cities, as in Equation 3.  
 It can now be seen that the solution to the social planner’s problem satisfies the 
conditions that together characterise the market equilibrium, provided that the government 
sets λλ =ˆ , MM ττ =ˆ  and SS ττ =ˆ . Since the social optimum satisfies Equation 6, the 
consumption of land irs  solves the decentralized consumer problem, and bid rents are as in 
Equations 9. Furthermore, as Equation 7 is satisfied, the bid rent at the city fringe equals 
agricultural rent plus development tax. Finally, the social optimum satisfies Equation 3 by 
construction. Thus, by setting lump sum and development taxes appropriately, the planner can 
decentralize the social optimum and the target utility level u* is attained in a market 
equilibrium. Furthermore, it should be noted that, since this result holds for any target utility,  
u* may be chosen in such a way that the associated lump sum tax equals zero. Hence, a 
market equilibrium in which appropriate development taxes constitute the only policy 
intervention corresponds to a social optimum with this target utility level.  
Throughout our application of the model, we prefer to consider market equilibria 
without lump sum taxes or transfers. However, welfare comparisons of such market equilibria 
are not straightforward, because they generally yield different levels of both utility and 
surplus. Therefore, we compare the surplus of different equilibria, while holding utility 
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constant through appropriate transfers.19 Social surplus then equals the sum of all lump sum 
taxes and the total land rent minus opportunity costs of agricultural use.  
 
When should a satellite city be founded? 
The costs of founding a satellite are not explicitly considered in our measure of social surplus 
in Equation 2, but they are a crucial determinant of the desirability of this policy. Ignoring the 
provision of other local public goods, we assume that these costs consist of the fixed costs of 
intercity infrastructure provision only. So in our model, in order to create a satellite, the 
government has to build a road that costs FC.20 The desirability of this investment derives 
from a comparison of social surplus with and without the satellite, where characteristics of the 
equilibrium with one city are obtained by constraining all households to live in the main city. 
Under any target utility level, foundation of the satellite is then desirable if the social surplus 
in the two city equilibrium exceeds surplus in the equilibrium with one city by more than FC. 
In our application, we will choose the specific target utility level for which decentralization of 
the optimal allocation in a system consisting of both the mother city and the satellite does not 
require lump sum transfers (so 0=λ ).  
 Properties of the surplus gain from founding a satellite will be explored numerically in 
following sections, so the discussion here is confined to some intuitive general properties. 
Ignoring fixed costs, when would there be a strictly positive surplus gain from founding a 
satellite at all? The satellite affects outcomes only if some households decide to locate there. 
Hence, the bid rent in the second city has to exceed the agricultural land rent plus an optimal 
development tax. Let us first assume that there is no difference in amenability, and that 
external effects of city size are absent. The satellite is then populated if transport costs to the 
city fringe exceed intercity commuting costs ( )icctr M > . If the distance between both cities 
should be large enough to avoid any externalities, commuting on the intercity transport link 
has to be considerably less costly per unit of distance than travel within the main city. It 
becomes even less likely that households are willing to live in the satellite if we also take 
differences in the level of urban amenities into account, as these render the main city more 
attractive. Hence, the demand for a satellite and the surplus it generates are entirely driven by 
                                                 
19
 Another possible solution to this problem would be to assume public land ownership, so that land rents are 
distributed over all households and surplus equals zero in all market equilibria. Welfare comparisons of different 
equilibria could then proceed simply through the comparison of equilibrium utility levels. However, in urban 
economic models, there is no obvious money metric for differences in utility. Notably, compensating and 
equivalent variation are problematic, since the marginal utility of income varies with location (Wildasin, 1986). 
This issue is avoided by keeping utility constant and comparing different surplus levels.  
20
 We abstract from any relationship between FC and the intercity commuting costs icc.  
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the negative externality of city size. This externality makes living in the main city less 
attractive, and its internalization in development taxes may raise the optimal population in the 
satellite further.21   
If the costs of providing intercity infrastructure are not too high, it may of course be 
desirable to found multiple satellites. The system of two cities that we have considered 
throughout this section may be readily extended with an arbitrary number of satellites, as long 
as these satellites are assumed to be symmetric in terms of amenability and the intercity 
commuting cost. This requires straightforward adjustments in the expressions for social 
surplus (Equation 2) and the population constraint (Equation 3). The condition for social 
desirability of founding an additional satellite remains that the gain in social surplus should 
exceed fixed founding costs, which determines the optimal number of satellites.22   
 
3 Application to Amsterdam and Almere 
 
This section applies our theoretical framework to the cities of Amsterdam and Almere. While 
the analysis of the previous section was carried out for an arbitrary well-behaved utility 
function, the choice of an appropriate functional form is essential for a meaningful applied 
welfare analysis. Hence, this issue is dealt with at the outset of the present section. Then, a 
brief discussion follows of the range of data from various sources that are available for 
calibration and validation of the model. We describe the procedure to find values for the 
model parameters that are not directly observed. Finally, some properties of the calibrated 
model are presented, and we validate our setup by comparing model outcomes with data that 
are not used in the calibration procedure.  
 
                                                 
21
 While we have so far assumed that all employment remains in the mother city, the attractiveness of founding a 
satellite increases strongly if at least a part of the jobs follow the population. Moreover, using regional time 
series data for the Netherlands, Vermeulen and Van Ommeren (2006) show that in the long run, employment 
adjusts to the local supply of labour, but in our application. However, the consequences of assuming all jobs to 
be in the Amsterdam CBD are limited for our policy analysis, as long as there are no scale economies in 
production. For instance, we could have assumed that there is no intercity commuting and that residents in 
Amsterdam and Almere receive the same wage. Since in our calibration, the model outcome should still match 
the data on land prices and the distribution of households over these cities, the resulting rise in the attractiveness 
of Almere would then have to be counterbalanced by an increase in the amenity differential. 
22
 It should be borne in mind, however, that our assumption that the presence and size of satellites does not affect 
utility in the main city may become increasingly untenable when their number rises, as they fragment the 
surrounding landscape.  
 17 
Functional form of utility  
The utility function used in our application is composed of a CES component in household 
consumption of land and the numeraire good, multiplied by functions of amenability and city 
size. In order to keep the model tractable, we set the elasticity of substitution between land 
and the numeraire good equal to 0.5.23 Some evidence in support for this assumption is 
presented in our discussion of the model validation. In the notation of section 2, we have: 
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When interpreting the elasticity of substitution, it should be borne in mind that we have not 
explicitly modelled the production of housing services with capital and land. Nevertheless, the 
capital component of housing is implicitly contained in the consumption of numeraire 
goods.24  
 Next to the CES component in land and numeraire goods, utility is proportional to the 
amenity level A and a negative function of the geographical city size S. We set AS = 1, so AM 
may  be interpreted as the relative attractiveness of living in the mother city in terms of access 
to local public goods other than open space. In choosing a functional form for the city size 
externality, we have allowed for the possibility that urban sprawl is more of an issue in large 
cities than in small towns. As long as S0 is positive, the function ( ) γ−+ SS 0  implies that the 
willingness to pay to avoid a 1% increase of S is rising with city size, while it is zero for a city 
of size zero.25 In the calibration, we will set S0 roughly equal to the size of Amsterdam, so that 
open space externalities are significantly more pressing in this city than in the smaller 
satellite. This assumption reflects the observation that land use controls are much more 
permissive in Almere than in Amsterdam, which was already illustrated in Figure 1 in the first 
section.  
 
                                                 
23
 This allows us to solve a large part of the model analytically, so that the numerical burden reduces to the 
search of roots in a limited number of nonlinear equations.  
24
 Local governments in the Netherlands tend to impose strong restrictions on high rise residential construction. 
Hence, the loss of keeping substitution of capital for land implicit in our model is probably limited. 
25
 Note that when we set S0 = 0, the willingness to pay to avoid a 1% increase of S does not depend on city size. 
In this case, the optimal restriction of residential land use in the main city and the satellite will be roughly 
comparable.  
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Data 
We choose the year 2002 as a base year for our calibration, considering annualized income 
and expenditures on land, numeraire consumption goods and transportation.26 Our discount 
rate is set at 5%, which is slightly higher than the real long interest rate in this period. For a 
number of exogenous city variables, such as transport costs to the CBD and the share of land 
in residential use, we consider data for Amsterdam only. While it is possible that these are 
different for Almere, but we do not want to introduce additional sources of heterogeneity in 
our model, in order to facilitate interpretation of the results. Table 1 presents data and 
estimated parameters for both calibration and validation of our model. A detailed account of 
sources and estimation methods is given in the Appendix. In particular, we have made use of 
data and results in Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008), who perform a hedonic analysis 
of house prices in Amsterdam. An estimate of the shadow price of present land use 
restrictions in both cities is obtained by comparing the price of new houses at the city fringe 
with total marginal construction costs. 
 
Table 1 
Data for the cities of Amsterdam and Almere 
Variable Value 
 Amsterdam Almere 
Data used for calibration   
number of households (1000) 405 63 
average disposable household income (1000 €) 24  
expenditure on land as a share of household income (%) 16  
share of total municipal land in residential use 0.4  
transport costs (€ / m) 0.34  
transport costs from Almere to Amsterdam fringe (€) 3100  
agricultural land rent plus conversion costs (€ / m2) 2.05  
shadow price of local land use restrictions (€ / m2) 14 -1.6 
   
Data used for validation   
quality controlled house price (index) 144 100 
median lot size  (m2) 95 144 
area of municipality in land (km2) 165 131 
Notes: See appendix for a discussion of estimation procedures and data sources.  
 
 
 In terms of the number of households, Amsterdam is clearly a much larger city than 
Almere. Although households are on average smaller in Amsterdam, the number of residents 
still exceeds Almere by almost a factor 5. About 40% of the land in Amsterdam is in 
                                                 
26
 Some data sources refer to another year in the period 2000 – 2005. 
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residential use, while the rest is used for infrastructure, industrial production, open space, 
agriculture and water. In order to account for this in the model, we impose that at each 
location in both cities, a share of 40% is available for residential use (so irL  = 0.8 pi r).27 
Another striking feature of Table 1 is that after controlling for characteristics of the dwelling, 
houses are almost 50% more expensive in Amsterdam than in Almere. Clearly, the premium 
paid by households that live in Amsterdam has to be compensated through either reduced 
commuting costs or a higher level of amenities. Presumably in response to the large price 
differential, median lot sizes in Amsterdam are significantly smaller than in Almere. Finally, 
we observe that estimates of the shadow price of land use regulation in both cities confirm 
that planning is much more restrictive in Amsterdam than in Almere, as was suggested by 
Figure 1. The data even indicate that residential land use in Almere is effectively subsidized.  
 
Choice of parameters that are not directly observed 
While N, w, t ,ω (the share of urban land in residential use) and pA are estimated directly, 
other model parameters have to be inferred by comparing properties of the implied 
equilibrium to data. In the utility function, we may set β = 1 without loss of generality. The 
parameter α is then chosen in such a way that the budget share of land in Amsterdam equals 
the observation in Table 1. The parameter γ is set in such a way that the optimal development 
tax in Amsterdam equals the estimate of the shadow price of the restrictiveness of land use 
regulation in this city. Note that we do not use the estimated shadow price of land use controls 
in Almere, since it is negative and in our model, the optimal development tax is nonnegative. 
Instead, we set S0 to 100 km2, which approximately equals the amount of land in residential 
use in Amsterdam, so that the optimal development tax in Almere is small (in the calibrated 
model we have τS = 2.52). The amenity level AM is set in such a way that the equilibrium 
number of households in Amsterdam is equal to the observed number. Finally, icc is set equal 
to the sum of the commuting costs from the Amsterdam CBD to the fringe plus the costs of 
commuting from the fringe of Amsterdam to the Almere CBD, as reported in Table 1. In the 
general equilibrium, these parameters have to be chosen simultaneously, yielding α = 479, γ = 
0.272, AM = 1.026 and icc = 5733. With these values, the city size externality is so important 
for utility that in order to internalize it properly, households Amsterdam need to spend about 
10.8% of their disposable household income on development taxes. 
  
                                                 
27
 In order to maintain internal consistency in the model, we also assume that it is the total amount of land in 
residential use in the city creates the externality Si, but this does not change the interpretation of the results.  
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Model validation 
In determining the model parameters, we have not made use of the observations in the lower 
panel of Table 1. This information is used to assess the performance of the calibrated model, 
by comparing it to the model outcomes as reported in Table 2. Our model is of course a highly 
stylized description of the equilibrium in both cities, so it is not reasonable to expect that the 
data used for validation are perfectly reproduced by the calibrated model. Nevertheless, it 
would be reassuring to find values in the same order of magnitude.  
 
Table 2 
City characteristics as obtained in the calibrated model 
Variable Value 
 Amsterdam Almere 
average land rent (€ / m2) 20.7 6.0 
average lotsize (m2) 186 293 
area of municipality (km2) 188 46 
Notes: Output generated with the calibrated model. 
 
 
 The first statistic that may be used for validation is the intercity house price 
differential of 44%. As shown in Table 2, land in Amsterdam is more than three times as 
expensive as land in Almere according to the model, which suggests that it overestimates the 
land price differential. However, the quality controlled house price differential is at best a 
very rough estimate of the land price differential. Since lots are smaller in Amsterdam, and 
since land expenditure is only a part of housing expenditure, the gap may be smaller than it 
seems at first sight. The second statistic considered is the average lot size in Amsterdam and 
Almere. In the model, these lot sizes are about twice as high as in the data, but their ratio is 
almost exactly the same.28 Finally, the actual surface of the Amsterdam municipality is only 
about 10% smaller than in the calibrated model. The size of the Almere municipality is much 
smaller in the model than in reality, but this is due to a higher share of agricultural land within 
the municipal borders, and probably also a smaller share of land in residential use within this 
city.  
 Figure 3 shows land rents and lot sizes as a function of the distance to the CBD in both 
cities, using the calibrated model again. As expected, land rents are falling with distance, and 
they jump to the agricultural land rent at the city fringe, the difference being the development 
                                                 
28
 The difference in levels arises from the fact that in the land use statistics, local infrastructure, certain consumer 
services (such as shops and local bank offices) and small parks are attributed to residential use. Hence, the 
amount of land in residential use in our data is much larger than the medium lot size times the number of 
households.  
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tax.29 The average slope of the land rent function in Amsterdam is -6.2% per kilometre, which 
compares reasonably with the -9.0% per kilometre reported in Rouwendal and Van der 
Straaten (2008). Given our calibration strategy, these slopes should coincide if average lot 
size in our model would exactly match the average lot size in the data. Lot sizes in 
Amsterdam rise on average with about 4.0% per kilometre, which again compares reasonably 
with the slope of +2.4% in the data used by these same authors.30 In particular, this second 
finding gives some confidence in our choice of the elasticity of substitution between land and 
the composite commodity, while suggesting that if anything, this elasticity was chosen too 
highly.31 Hence, the calibrated model appears to perform reasonably well, particularly in view 
of its highly stylized characters.  
 
Figure 3: Land rents and lot sizes in Amsterdam and Almere 
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 With the calibrated model, we may calculate the surplus gross of founding costs that 
was generated by setting up the satellite Almere. To this aim, we first derive the equilibrium 
that would result if all households were to reside in Amsterdam. In this equilibrium, the city 
size increases with about 12%, and the optimal development tax rises to almost 16 € / m2. In 
order to maintain the target utility level u*, households need to receive a lump sum transfer of 
837 €. The difference between the surplus in the two city equilibrium and the surplus in this 
equilibrium then equals 99.7 million €, representing a present discounted value of about 2 
billion €. It is this amount that may be spent at most on fixed founding costs.32 
                                                 
29
 By differentiation of the bid rent function (Equation 9) with respect to distance, it may be seen that restrictions 
or taxes on residential land use which reduce lot sizes lead to steeper land rent gradients. Indeed, in Figure 3, 
land rents fall steeper with distance to the CBD in Amsterdam than in Almere.  
30
 We thank Willemijn van der Straaten for kindly providing us with this information, which is not reported in 
the paper.  
31
 Note that with a substitution elasticity of zero, as in a Leontief utility function, lot sizes do not vary with 
distance to the CBD. This is the case that is often considered in the theoretical literature on growth controls.  
32
 There is some reason to believe that the costs of providing intercity infrastructure are roughly in this order of 
magnitude. The costs of constructing the Betuwelijn, a railroad with a length of 100 kilometres, are about 6 
billion €, and the distance between Amsterdam and Almere is about a third of this length.  
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4 Comparative statics and policy analysis 
 
Conditional on the assumptions that underlie our model and its calibration, a welfare 
economic framework for the evaluation of land use policies has now been obtained. In this 
section, we present comparative statics of the optimal policy, as well as an indication of the 
social costs of implementing suboptimal policies. Furthermore, we contrast the optimal 
allocation of households over the system of cities with government plans, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, for various scenarios of income and demographic growth.  
 
Comparative static analysis 
The extent to which both the surplus of founding a satellite and the optimal development tax 
in both cities depend on key model parameters is reported in Table 3. As in the previous 
section, this surplus is calculated as the difference between the surplus in the two-city 
equilibrium and the surplus in the equilibrium with one city in which the same utility level is 
attained, and it is interpreted as the annualized amount that may be spent on fixed founding 
costs. In order to shed light on the underlying model mechanics, the table also reports 
adjustments on the extensive margin (city size) and the intensive margin (average population 
density) of land use in each city. These elasticities may be summed to obtain the 
responsiveness of the number of households in each city with respect to model parameters.  
 
Table 3 
Elasticities of model outputs with respect to key parameters 
 Main city Satellite SS 
 SM NM / SM τM SS NS / SS τS  
icc 0.22 0.14 0.26 -1.88 -0.43 -2.30 -4.09 
AM 0.71 0.47 0.85 -5.32 -2.32 -6.67 -12.53 
γ -0.62 0.44 1.11 0.55 0.61 2.06 2.42 
w 0.54 -0.99 0.37 3.17 -0.26 3.71 6.37 
N 0.53 0.35 0.63 1.25 0.55 1.58 2.76 
Notes: The variables NM and NS denote the population in the main city and satellite respectively. See section 2 
for the interpretation of other symbols. The elasticities in this table reflect changes in variables between different 
equilibria, where the target utility level is adjusted in each equilibrium so that there are no lump sum transfers. 
They are computed numerically by evaluating the equilibrium while multiplying a specific parameter by 1.001 
and then multiplying the relative change in all output variables by 1000.  
 
 
 Let us consider the impact of a 10% increase in intercity commuting costs (amounting 
to 573 €). A rise in these costs makes living in Almere less attractive. Hence, the equilibrium 
share of households that locate in Amsterdam expands from 87% to 90%. Increased demand 
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for land pushes up prices here, so the average density raises by 1.4%. Households that remain 
in the satellite have lots that are 13 m2 larger on average, substituting away from the 
consumption of numeraire goods. In response to the increased city size, the optimal 
development tax in the main city rises slightly, while it falls with 23% in Almere. Perhaps 
most significantly, the surplus of founding the satellite falls with 41% after a 10% rise in 
intercity commuting costs. This suggests that the surplus of founding Almere could have been 
much higher if it had been setup closer to Amsterdam, although negative externality effects 
might then have been induced that are not accounted for in our model.33 Another interesting 
implication is that, with a long run decline in transportation costs, the foundation of satellites 
becomes increasingly attractive. On the other hand, congestion on the intercity infrastructure 
network, which happens to be substantial in reality, raises the social costs of this policy.  
 The comparative static impact of raising the amenability of Amsterdam is qualitatively 
similar to the effect of a rise in intercity commuting costs. The attractiveness of the main city 
is increased and the distribution of households over the cities and land consumption adjust 
accordingly. Quantitatively, however, the effects are much larger. A 1% increase in AM 
already leads to a 1.2% increase the in share of households in Amsterdam, and a 13% loss in 
surplus. Besides the way in which amenities enter utility in our calibrated model, this is also a 
consequence of the fact that the amenability of Amsterdam matters directly for a much larger 
group of households than the intercity commuting costs. Note that while amenability is 
exogenous in our model, it may be regarded as a first pass on endogenous differences in 
attractiveness, such as the existence of agglomeration economies in production and 
consumption.34 This first pass then suggests that positive agglomeration externalities reduce 
the social surplus of founding a satellite.  
 Comparative static properties of the other parameters may be interpreted along similar 
lines. As it is the negative externality of city size that motivates government intervention, it is 
not surprising that both optimal development taxes and the social surplus from founding a 
satellite are elastic with respect to the parameter γ. In response to higher development taxes, 
households reduce their consumption of land and the population density in both cities 
increases. The distribution of households shifts towards the satellite, as the externality renders 
                                                 
33
 Ignoring intercity externalities, the optimal distance between Amsterdam and Almere would be zero in our 
model, but this is not consistent with our interpretation of the city size externality. At least, if residents of 
Amsterdam would want to enjoy true open space at the urban fringe, the satellite should be so far away that it is 
not visible from there. However, one would think that a 10 kilometres distance would suffice for this, rather then 
the 30 kilometres that separate these cities presently.  
34
 As long as satellites are small relative to the main city, scale effects in this city are only marginally affected by 
their foundation. 
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the main city less attractive. An increase in w raises the demand for land, which is obviously a 
normal good. The income elasticity of average lot sizes in Amsterdam is approximately equal 
to unity, which is also the income elasticity of the demand for land that is implied by our 
utility function. The size of Almere is much more sensitive with respect to this variable than 
Amsterdam, the income elasticity of the number of households in Almere being equal to 2.9. 
Hence, the social surplus from founding the satellite is also highly elastic with respect to 
household income, and under a long-run upward trend in incomes, this policy becomes 
increasingly attractive. Finally, an increase in N pushes up the demand for land as well, and as 
prices rise, land use in both cities adjusts accordingly along the intensive and the extensive 
margin. Hence, the average consumption of land falls in both cities, and the distribution of 
households shifts towards the satellite. The social surplus of founding Almere is also highly 
elastic with respect to the total number of households that are accommodated in the system.  
 
Social costs of suboptimal policies 
While for the calibration of our model, it was assumed that negative externalities of city size 
were large enough to justify the observed shadow prices of land use restrictions, it is also 
possible that land use regulation is set too restrictively. Table 4 explores the welfare economic 
consequences of setting a suboptimal policy. The three columns refer to different true values 
of the externality parameter γ and the rows contain policy scenario’s whose optimality is 
conditional on a perceived value of this parameter. For each column, we report social surplus 
for a target utility that obtains under the optimal land use policy without lump sum transfers. 
So throughout the first column for instance, in which there is no negative externality of city 
size at all, the target utility level is chosen such that the optimal allocation is obtained in a free 
market equilibrium in which there are neither development taxes nor lump sum transfers, and 
there is only one city. Note that surplus values cannot be compared across columns, because 
they refer to different utility functions and target utility levels.35  
For a meaningful comparison, it is perhaps most useful to consider the second column 
of Table 4, in which the true city size externality parameter equals 0.136. For sufficiently 
large fixed costs of founding the satellite, it is optimal to accommodate all households in a 
single city. The first best development tax is then equal to 6.58 € / m2. If the government fails 
to levy a development tax in response to the externality, social surplus is reduced by about 
                                                 
35
 See our discussion in section 2. 
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17%, or almost 2% of disposable household income.36 If the government sets land use 
regulation at a level that is too restrictive, as it mistakenly perceives a value γ = 0.272, 7% of 
the social surplus is lost. Under a true externality parameter of 0.136, the social surplus of 
founding a satellite gross of fixed founding costs is positive if development taxes are set either 
optimally or too restrictively. However, under optimal development taxes, only 9 million € 
would be left annually for fixed founding costs.  
 
Table 4 
Annual social surplus (in 109 €) under various externalities and policy scenarios 
 γ = 0 γ = 0.136 γ = 0.272 
One city, τM = 0 0.595 (first best) 0.962 0.630 + FC 
One city, τM = 6.58 0.439 1.164 (first best) 1.267 + FC 
One city, τM = 15.88 0.157 1.079 1.375 + FC 
Two cities, τM = 6.40, τS = 0.39 - 1.173 - FC 1.395 
Two cities, τM = 14.00, τS = 2.52 0.211 - FC 1.104 - FC 1.475 (first best) 
Notes: The table shows welfare effects of land use policies under various scenarios of true and perceived city 
size externality parameters. True values of this parameter are in columns, and policy scenarios in rows. In each 
column, target utility is the utility level obtained in the first best equilibrium, in which there are no lump sum 
transfers and development taxes are set as in the baseline calibration. The term FC refers to the annual fixed 
costs of founding the satellite. Surplus values cannot be compared across columns, as they refer to different 
target utility levels.  
 
 
 Obviously, if no negative externality of city size exists, all households should be 
accommodated in one city, and no development taxes should be levied. If the government 
does levy a development tax, misperceiving the externality parameter to be 0.272, social 
surplus is reduced by 74%. In this scenario, the benefits of founding a satellite gross of fixed 
costs are positive. So, even if there is no land use externality, suboptimal land use restrictions 
may render the foundation of a satellite socially desirable. The last column of Table 4 
indicates that the foundation of a satellite is socially desirable as long as annualized fixed 
costs do not exceed 100 million €, if γ equals its calibrated value. Failing to implement land 
use restrictions costs 57% of the social surplus, gross of fixed founding costs.  
 
Optimal planning in scenarios for demographic and income growth 
Although we have so far analysed optimal development taxation, direct land use regulation is 
the more common way to steer land use patterns. In the Netherlands, national and local 
governments plan both the amount of land for residential development and the number of 
                                                 
36
 This number is smaller but in the same order of magnitude as the net social costs of growth boundaries in the 
case of Reading, UK, as estimated by Cheshire and Sheppard (2002). These authors found that relaxing it 
substantially would lead to a welfare gain of almost 4% of household income.  
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houses to be built in a municipality, and any mismatch between regulated supply and market 
demand is consequently reflected in shadow rents on residential land use. As indicated by 
Figure 1, the majority of new houses in the system Amsterdam-Almere is to be realised in the 
satellite. It makes sense to contrast these plans to the optimal distribution of additional 
households over these cities in our model. Table 5 indicates the number of new households 
that should optimally be accommodated in Almere under various scenarios. The dimensions 
of these scenarios are the number of new households to be accommodated in the system and 
disposable household income.  
 
Table 5 
Optimal number of households in Almere under various scenarios 
 ∆N = 0 ∆N = 1000 ∆N = 10,000 ∆N = 100,000 
Y = 24000 € 63000 63243 65432 87902 
Y = 32000 € 110145 110463 113325 142301 
Y = 40000 € 137999 138356 141575 174008 
Notes: The table shows the optimal number of households for various values of the disposable household income 
and the number of additional households to be accommodated in the system.  
 
 
 If we keep disposable household income at the level at which the model is calibrated, 
about 75% of all households should be accommodated in the main city, virtually irrespective 
of their number. This proportion contrasts starkly with planned construction in Figure 1, 
casting doubt on the social desirability of these plans. However, we have seen that the optimal 
proportion of households in Amsterdam is fairly sensitive to income. With a real income 
growth rate of 1 - 2% per year over a horizon of 30 years, which is roughly the horizon of 
planning documents, this effect is therefore considerable. If no new households were to be 
accommodated in the system, a real income increase of 33% would shift the optimal 
proportion of households in Almere from 13.5% to 23.5%, and a 67% increase would raise it 
to almost 30%. So if the costs of demolishing and reconstructing dwellings could be ignored, 
houses should be destroyed in Amsterdam and rebuilt in Almere, while all lot sizes should be 
increased. Since this is a very costly thing to do in reality, it may be sensible to anticipate the 
demand effects of future income growth in present land use plans. If for instance, 100,000 
new additional households are to be accommodated in the system and a 33% real income 
increase is projected, only about 20,000 new houses should be built in Amsterdam, and the 
rest in Almere. All other scenarios in Table 5 in which disposable household income exceeds 
the calibrated value involve a reduction of the number of households in Amsterdam.  
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One should realize, however, that adjustments in the land consumption of individual 
households are ignored in this table, although our comparative static results indicate that these 
are significant as well. Through this channel, the optimal size of Amsterdam is increasing in 
both income and the total number of households.37 Hence, the findings in this table do 
certainly not imply that, in the face of income and demographic growth, geographical growth 
boundaries around this city should remain as they are currently drawn.38 Another caveat is 
that transport costs within and between cities are assumed to remain constant in these 
scenarios, although in reality, the time costs of travel are likely to increase with income. As 
we have seen, higher transport costs make Amsterdam a more attractive location, thus 
counteracting the income effect. Finally, with rising surplus of founding a satellite, it may 
become preferable to accommodate households in a third new city. This possibility is further 
explored in the next section.  
 
5 Extension with multiple satellites 
 
At the end of section 2, we have briefly indicated how our theoretical framework could be 
extended with multiple symmetric satellites. Maintaining parameter values that were obtained 
in the calibration, we now explore the consequences of this extension for our policy analysis. 
Table 6 shows social surplus gross of founding costs as a function of the number of satellites, 
as well as the optimal distribution of households over the resulting system of cities. In order to 
enable the comparison of surplus in different equilibria, the target utility is held constant at 
the equilibrium level in a system with one satellite and no lump sum transfers. The policy 
setting to which this corresponds is a government that decides to found a certain number of 
satellites in addition to the one that exists already. Development taxes are chosen optimally in 
all equilibria considered.  
 When founding costs are ignored, social surplus is increasing in the number of 
satellites, but the associated surplus gain falls with each additional satellite. Hence, the 
optimal number of satellites may be determined if founding costs are known. For instance, it 
is not optimal to found a second satellite as long as these costs exceed 59 million € per year, 
                                                 
37
 With a 67% income increase and no additional households, the optimal size of Amsterdam increases with 
32%, with 100,000 additional households and no income growth, it increases with 11%, and with both income 
and demographic growth, it increases with 47%. 
38
 The elasticity of optimal total residential land consumption with respect to income equals about 1.0. However, 
the evidence in Vermeulen and Rouwendal (2007) suggests that income induced demand shifts are not 
accommodated at all by the supply of residential land, as a consequence of government interventions in land and 
housing markets. If our assumptions about the land use externality are valid, it follows that this extent of 
restrictiveness cannot be socially optimal.  
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and with annualized fixed founding costs of about 25 million €, the government should set up 
three satellites in addition to the one that is already in place. As the third and fourth columns 
in Table 6 indicate, the number of households in the main city and a typical satellite are both 
decreasing in the number of satellites. Nevertheless, given the calibrated parameters in our 
model, even in a system with 7 satellites, the main city should still contain about two thirds of 
the population.  
 
Table 6 
The foundation of multiple satellites 
#(satellites) SS (109 €) ∆SS (106 €) NM / N NS / N 
1 1.48 99.7 0.865 0.135 
2 1.53 58.6 0.794 0.103 
3       1.57 40.0 0.748 0.084 
4 1.60 29.6 0.716 0.071 
5 1.63 23.0 0.691 0.062 
6 1.64 18.6 0.672 0.055 
7 1.66 15.4 0.656 0.049 
Notes: The table indicates the social surplus associated with an increasing number of satellites, as well as the 
distribution of households over the system of cities. The second column derives from the first one, indicating the 
surplus gain from founding the marginal satellite. Target utility is the utility level that is obtained in the 
equilibrium with one satellite without lump sum transfers. In each equilibrium, development taxes are assumed 
to be set optimally. 
 
 
 As we have seen, the surplus of founding a satellite is elastic with respect to model 
parameters and as a consequence, the optimal number of satellites must be sensitive to these 
parameters as well. Again, given the institutional context in which housing supply in the 
Netherlands takes place, it is interesting to see how the optimal number of satellites alters 
with the number of households that are to be accommodated in the system. Hence, Figure 4 
shows the number of households in the main city and a representative satellite as a function of 
the number of new households, when an optimal policy with respect to the foundation of 
satellites is conducted. We assume annualized fixed founding costs of 60 million €, so that 
foundation of a second satellite is just not desirable in the calibrated equilibrium.  
 Given these fixed founding costs, the foundation of a satellite becomes optimal with 
5,000 additional households already. At this point, the optimal number of households in the 
main city drops to 370,000, whereas the optimal number of households in both satellites drops 
to 52,000. Foundation of the third satellite becomes desirable when 58,000 new households 
are to be accommodated in the system, and the number of households in the main city and all 
satellites then drops to a slightly higher value than with 5,000 additional households. 
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Interestingly, the peaks in the number of households in each city become lower, when the 
total number of households in the system increases, so demographic growth does not appear 
to call for major expansions of the main city or the first satellite in this model. 
 
Figure 4: Number of households in main city and  
a representative satellites under demographic growth 
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 With annual fixed founding costs of 60 million € and an income elasticity of the 
surplus of 6.4 (see Table 3), the equilibrium number of satellites is particularly sensitive to 
household income. If this rises to 32,000 €, it is already optimal for the government to found 5 
additional satellites in our model. In the resulting system of cities, almost half of all 
households remain in the main city and each satellite contains less than 10% of the total 
population. So, although our analysis in the previous section suggested that when expected 
real income growth is taken into account, new households should be predominantly 
accommodated in Almere, it now appears that, as long as founding costs are not too high, they 
should rather be accommodated in new satellites in these scenarios. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
We have shown that the existence of a negative externality of city size may, from a welfare 
economic perspective, justify the imposition of growth controls and the foundation of 
satellites. With rising incomes and declining transport costs, the foundation of satellites 
becomes increasingly attractive. This suggests that clustered deconcentration, a policy that is 
or has been conducted in various European countries, may be a socially preferable alternative 
to unregulated urban sprawl. Even so, growth controls should be less restrictive in satellites 
only to the extent that the externality is less relevant for people in small towns than for 
inhabitants of a big city. In particular, it is never optimal to subsidize land use in a satellite 
with this type of externality.  
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 The widespread popularity of urban containment policies renders the existence of a 
negative externality of city size plausible a priori, and it is commonly assumed in a class of 
theoretical growth control models (cf. Brueckner, 1999). It should be borne in mind, however, 
that the welfare economic motivation for a clustered deconcentration policy depends crucially 
on the precise specification of this externality. For instance, if the relevant externality relates 
to the total stock of open space, as in Brueckner (2001) and Bento et al. (2006), it is never 
optimal to found a satellite, as this increases residential land use at the regional level. If on the 
other hand, people value proximity to public parks much more than access to open space 
outside cities, as suggested by Cheshire and Sheppard (2001), neither the imposition of 
growth controls nor the foundation of satellites are called for. And to the extent that traffic 
congestion externalities are relevant, congestion tolls are preferable to growth controls in a 
first-best environment. Making use of a calibrated model, we find that the optimal land use 
policy is also highly sensitive to the quantitative significance of the city size externality. 
Moreover, the social costs of implementing a suboptimal policy appear to be substantial. 
Hence, policymakers should acquire a thorough understanding of the type and size of land use 
externalities before embarking on clustered deconcentration.  
  Our analysis is applied to the cities of Amsterdam and Almere. In the model 
calibration, parameters for the negative externality of city size are chosen that render the 
observed shadow price of land use restrictions optimal. It is implied that households in 
Amsterdam should spend about 10% of their income on a development tax, or alternatively, 
on the increase in prices that is caused by land use restrictions. While this extent of 
restrictiveness is optimal in our analysis by assumption, the calibrated model may be used to 
shed light on plans to accommodate new housing demand in the region predominantly in 
Almere. In a comparative static analysis, we find that ceteris paribus, about 75% of new 
households should be located in Amsterdam. If expected income growth is taken into account, 
it makes sense to concentrate household growth in Almere, but Amsterdam should be allowed 
to expand nevertheless, because household demand for land is pushed up. Furthermore, both 
demographic and income growth make it increasingly attractive to divert new households to 
new satellites, if we allow for them. Hence, it seems difficult to reconcile present plans for 
restrictions around Amsterdam and growth in Almere with the optimal policy that is dictated 
by a negative externality of city size.  
A number of caveats apply to these policy recommendations. Land use restrictions in 
Amsterdam exist partly because of its proximity to an airport and some areas near this city do 
arguably have special environmental or historical value. We abstract from such considerations 
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in our model. Interpretation of the income growth scenarios is somewhat troubled by the fact 
that housing and urban structure are not malleable in practice, while our analysis assumes that 
they are. A large share of the housing stock in Amsterdam is allocated to the social rental 
sector, so our assumption of market based housing supply is not fully appropriate. 
Furthermore, labour markets and economies of agglomeration have been dealt with in a very 
stylized manner. Finally, heterogeneity and distributional aspects are ignored in this paper, 
even if various studies indicate the relevance of such issues (cf. Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002, 
Bento et al., 2006). In particular, even if we abstract from any rent seeking behaviour that it 
might induce, benefits from the direct regulation of land use that is common in the 
Netherlands accrue to a significant extent to the owners of land, and a full analysis of welfare 
effects should therefore take account of their proper weight in aggregate social welfare.  
 
Appendix: Data used for the model calibration 
 
This appendix accounts for the data sources and estimation procedures used to obtain the 
figures in Table 1.  
• The number of households in Amsterdam and Almere in the year 2002 is reported by 
Statistics Netherlands.  
• The median lot size is computed from transaction records by the Dutch Association of 
Realtors (NVM) in the years 1999 and 2000. As a measure for lotsize, we have used 
the total surface for condominiums, and the lotsize as recorded by the land registry for 
single family dwellings. The amount of land used by condominiums is smaller than 
the total surface in the case of high-rise buildings, but land use was not observed in 
our data for many apartments. As the share of condominiums is significantly larger in 
Amsterdam, this implies that we may overestimate the land use per household in this 
city in particular. On the other hand, the amount of high-rise residential buildings is 
limited by regulation, so that this bias may be limited as well. Furthermore, it should 
be borne in mind that these figures refer to the owner-occupier sector, whereas the 
social rental sector is particularly large in Amsterdam. Since social housing 
construction is rather insensitive to market signals, this implies that we may 
underestimate the average lotsize for the total housing stock in this city.  
• Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008) estimate the average price of residential land 
in Amsterdam in a hedonic analysis of house prices as 806 € per m2. We have 
estimated the average lot size in Amsterdam as 95 m2, so the value of land in an 
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average house amounts to about 77,000 €. Discounting with a rate of 5%, this yields 
an annual expenditure on land of 3,800 €. The average disposable household income 
in Amsterdam is 24,000 €, using data from a Dutch housing demand survey (WBO) 
for the year 2002. Hence, we estimate the average expenditure share of land in the 
household budget to be about 16% in Amsterdam.  
• At the municipal level, 37% of the non-agricultural land is allocated to residential use 
(data for 2005, provided by the municipal government of Amsterdam). This figure 
may underestimate the share of space in residential use within the urban area, given 
the way municipal borders are drawn. Using the same data as in Rouwendal and Van 
der Straaten (2008), the share of land in residential use has been estimated to be 53% 
in the centre of Amsterdam, and 36% in a more peripheral neighbourhood (Zuider 
Amstel). For the calibration, we use a share of 40%. Note that this is also in 
accordance with the share of land in residential use within urban areas in Reading 
(38%) and Darlington (43%), as reported by Cheshire and Sheppard (2002).  
• As jobs in Amsterdam are scattered over the entire city, it seems problematic to 
calibrate annual transport costs to the CBD by estimating travel times and inferring 
costs and the valuation of time. Instead, we calibrate the parameter t on the slope of 
the bid rent curve. In a hedonic analysis of house prices in Amsterdam, Rouwendal 
and Van der Straaten (2008) report that a 1 kilometre increase in the distance to the 
city centre decreases the value of a house by 9%, conditional on a range of control 
variables. We use this coefficient to estimate the transport costs per unit of distance 
from the CBD. By use of the envelope theorem, the derivative of the bid rent function 
with respect to transport costs equals *ir
i
r strp −=∂∂ , where *irs  follows from 
solving the consumer problem. We rewrite this to ( ) rpspt iririr ∂∂−= log* . From the 
estimates in Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008), it follows that ( ) rpir ∂∂ log  is 
equal to -0.00009. For *irirsp  we substitute the average annual expenditure on land, 
which equals 3,800 € (see our discussion of the expenditure share of land in the 
disposable household income). This yields an estimate of the annual travel costs per 
meter of distance from the CBD of 0.34 €. 
• In an analysis of possibilities for new construction in North Holland, SEO(2003) 
estimates the price of agricultural land at 4 € / m2, and the costs of conversion to 
residential land at 37 € / m2. It is assumed here that the share of conversion in the total 
construction costs is in accordance with the share of land conversion in the total 
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production by building contractors in national accounts, and the estimate of the 
conversion costs obtains by multiplying this share with the average construction costs 
per square meter in North Holland.  
• The shadow price of land use regulation is estimated by subtracting the price of 
agricultural land and conversion costs from the price of residential land at the city 
fringe. The Amsterdam city fringe is represented by the Bovenkerkerpolder in the 
south of this city. Ecorys-NEI (2004) estimates the value of a newly constructed house 
in this area to be 344,000 €. Subtracting land, conversion and construction costs, they 
estimate the shadow price of land use regulation to be 42,000 € per house. These 
calculations assume a density of construction of 26 houses per hectare. Assuming that 
40% of the land is used for housing, this yields an average housing size of 154 m2. 
Hence, the shadow price is 273 € per meter, which amounts to 14 €/m2 per year.39 The 
same study estimates the shadow price of land use regulation in Almere to be - 5,000 € 
per house, which amounts to -1.6 €/m2 per year. This estimate suggests that the price 
of new housing in this city is not sufficient to cover all costs associated with its land 
use and construction, so that residential land use in Almere is effectively subsidized.  
• The quality controlled house price differential is obtained by regressing the logarithm 
of house prices on housing characteristics and dummies for Amsterdam and Almere, 
using the WBO data again. The characteristics used are the type of house (detached, 
semi-detached, terraced corner, terraced non-corner, apartment), the number of rooms, 
the size of the living room and the kitchen, availability of an elevator, garage, garden, 
balcony, central heating, double glazing and the period of construction. Controlled for 
these characteristics, housing in Amsterdam is 35% more expensive than the national 
average, and in Almere it is 6% less expensive.  
• The area of the municipalities refers too land only, so it ignores cannels, lakes and 
other water. It should be noted that the municipal borders are drawn quite widely 
around the built up area. For instance, the municipal share of land in agriculture was 
18% in Amsterdam and 33% in Almere (Bodemstatistiek 2000). Hence, this is likely 
to be a poor proxy for the size of the two cities, although it still gives some rough idea 
of their order of magnitude.   
                                                 
39
 SEO (2003) estimates the shadow price of land use regulation in Amsterdam to be 550 €/m2, which is almost 
twice as high as our estimate. However, local conversion and construction costs are estimated more roughly in 
this study, and it considers average house prices in Amsterdam, rather than prices at the city fringe. Nevertheless, 
this suggests that our estimate of the shadow price of land use regional in this area is conservative.  
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• Theoretically, we have modelled the intercity infrastructure as a direct link between 
the CBD’s of the main city and the satellite. In reality, residents of Almere have to 
travel to the Amsterdam fringe (knooppunt Watergraafsmeer). From that point 
onwards, they face about the same travel costs as people who live near the fringe of 
Amsterdam. Hence, we proxy the transport costs faced by a resident of Almere by the 
sum of the transport costs from Almere to the fringe of Amsterdam and the transport 
costs from the fringe of Amsterdam to the CBD. The transport costs from the fringe of 
Amsterdam to the CBD follow from our estimate of t and the size of Amsterdam. The 
distance from Almere to the fringe of Amsterdam is 25 kilometres, and the average 
velocity during rush hours is about 60 kilometres per hour. The Dutch Transport 
Research Centre (AVV) estimates the valuation of travel time in 2005 to be 8.43 € per 
hour, and the variable costs of car use are estimated to be 0.101 € per kilometre. This 
results in daily commuting costs between Almere and the Amsterdam city fringe of 
about 12 €. With 260 working days a year, the annual costs are then about 3100 €.  
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